# 🔑 No seed phrase, no key to lose — the Keplr "log in with Google" breach, in plain words

**URL:** <https://onehack.st/t/no-seed-phrase-no-key-to-lose-the-keplr-log-in-with-google-breach-in-plain-words/327093>\
**Category:** News & Articles\
**Tags:** hacking, trading, security\
**Created:** [November 8, 2026, 9:41am UTC](https://onehack.st/t/no-seed-phrase-no-key-to-lose-the-keplr-log-in-with-google-breach-in-plain-words/327093 "2026-11-08T09:41:41Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 1\
**Page:** 1

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**Author:** ![cryptonode-nickevin](https://onehack.st/user_avatar/onehack.st/cryptonode-nickevin/32/180723_2.png) [@cryptonode-nickevin](https://onehack.st/u/cryptonode-nickevin)\
**Post date:** [November 8, 2026, 9:41am UTC](https://onehack.st/t/no-seed-phrase-no-key-to-lose-the-keplr-log-in-with-google-breach-in-plain-words/327093/1 "2026-11-08T09:41:41Z")

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### THE KEY WAS IN PIECES. THE PIECES WERE THEIRS.

**Nov 6, 21:13 UTC.** I’ve had this one pinned since the first notice, and the whole story sits in one question.

 ![wallet key split into shares](https://onehack.st/uploads/default/original/3X/e/8/e891731aa309dab408a2a23873a74cb9e6472a62.png)  

One key, cut into shares — and a login button that puts them back together.

**Who holds the pieces of your key?**

| how you made it | who holds the key | a breach there reaches |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 🔑 Google / Apple login | shares held on the provider’s side | every wallet behind it |
| 📝 Seed phrase | the paper in your drawer | one phrase, one wallet |
| 🔐 Hardware wallet | the device in your hand | one device, one wallet |

The convenience was the exposure: no phrase to lose, and no phrase to hold.

**Tonight, in four moves**

- 🔎 **Check the published list** — [Keplr’s verified recovery addresses](https://x.com/keplrwallet/status/2119316885737177339) cover 11 Cosmos chains and one EVM address across 8 EVM chains (Nov 8, 06:31 UTC).
- 🧊 **Google and Apple login stay off** — [Web3Auth’s status page](https://status.web3auth.io/) shows the login service in maintenance, and a seed-phrase or hardware account carries on exactly as before.
- 💸 **Move liquid assets out** of any Google or Apple Keplr account, and keep new funds out of that account.
- 🛡 **Check through the teams only** — Keplr is building its affected-account checker; every “check your wallet” page and DM offering recovery this week is bait.

> **🔎 The full timeline, the tracing, and the one number nobody has**
>
> **The timeline**
> 
> - **Nov 6, 20:52 UTC** — the first sweep lands on chain, 21 minutes before the first notice.
> - **Nov 6, 21:13 UTC** — Web3Auth discloses a security issue, pauses the embedded wallet service, and reports no evidence that MetaMask users are impacted.
> - **Nov 7, 04:38 UTC** — Keplr reports unauthorised transactions on accounts created with Google or Apple, flags them to Web3Auth, and switches both logins off.
> - **Nov 7, 05:18 ET** — a Cosmos Hub batch turns 2,265.59 staked ATOM from six accounts into transferable staking claims, with the memo `lsm recovery batch` — [the forum report](https://forum.cosmos.network/t/urgent-security-report-theft-of-staked-atom-via-lsm-tokenize-shares-cosmos-hub/17550) names the delegator.
> - **Nov 7, 17:17 UTC** — Keplr names the cause: a Web3Auth infrastructure vulnerability that exposed private keys.
> - **Nov 8, 06:31 UTC** — Keplr publishes the verified recovery-address list.
> 
> **The numbers, each with its owner**
> 
> - **44,041 wallets** on seven Cosmos chains plus **7,603** on Injective sent funds to two addresses that held **$6.01M** by 15:38 UTC on Nov 7 — [Bitquery’s balance snapshot](https://bitquery.io/investigations/keplr-wallet-hack), a floor rather than a total.
> - Those two addresses are the ones Web3Auth published as its **recovery** wallets; Bitquery called them attacker collectors, and the attribution stays open.
> - **86%** of the traced funds left after Keplr’s 04:38 warning — pausing a login protects fresh logins, not keys already out.
> - **1.96M staked ATOM** moved without the 21-day unbonding, through tokenized shares; median loss $1.34, largest $325K, and 81,006 USDC on Noble sits where Circle can freeze it.
> - Josh Lee’s early estimate: **~20%** of Google and Apple accounts. Keplr and Web3Auth have published no confirmed total.
> 
> **What is still open**
> 
> - No CVE, no root-cause write-up, no audit, and no confirmed loss total from either company.
> - The design is the story: two of the three key shares sit on the provider’s side, and its nodes hold the key that unlocks a third. A breach on that side meets the threshold without touching your device. Web3Auth has not said which component failed.
> - Dungeon Wallet is the second app named on the list, and Lava Network issued its own alert.
> - A delegator can start unbonding and revoke `authz` from a compromised address; `disable-tokenize-shares` ([docs](https://docs.cosmos.network/hub/latest/modules/liquid)) is the setting to hold before an incident, since switching it back takes the full 21 days.
> - Rescue transfers look exactly like drains, which is why balances vanished from wallets that were being protected.

Sources: Web3Auth’s status page and disclosures · Keplr’s notices (Nov 7–8) · Bitquery’s investigation · MetaMask Embedded Wallets docs.
  

Plus Cosmos liquid-staking docs · the Cosmos Hub forum report · crypto.news · cybersixt · 0xCERT · KuCoin News · The Defiant.

What do you guys think — was “log in with Google” for a wallet always going to end like this, or is this one provider’s bad week?

And be honest: how many of your wallets were made with a social login instead of a seed phrase?
