North Korea Cloned a CEO’s Face to Hack 100M Weekly Downloads
North Korea Cloned a CEO’s Face to Hack 100M Weekly DownloadsA developer joined a Microsoft Teams call with what looked like real executives. It was North Korea. He installed their “audio fix.” Three hours later, 80% of the cloud was at risk.
100 million downloads per week. 80% of cloud environments. Compromised in under 3 hours. The axios npm package — one of the most trusted tools in JavaScript — briefly became a credential-stealing backdoor after North Korean hackers used AI deepfakes, fake Slack workspaces, and a cloned CEO to social-engineer the lead maintainer. The malicious versions were pulled Tuesday, but Google warns the “far-reaching impacts” could linger for months across infected systems.
🧩 Dumb Mode Dictionary
| Term | Translation |
|---|---|
| npm package | Reusable code library that JavaScript developers download instead of writing everything from scratch (like LEGO blocks for websites) |
| Supply chain attack | Hackers poison a trusted tool so everyone who uses it gets infected automatically |
| Deepfake | AI-generated video/audio that clones someone’s face and voice so convincingly you can’t tell it’s fake |
| Two-factor authentication (2FA) | Security layer requiring a phone code + password (the maintainer had this enabled and still got hacked) |
| Remote access Trojan (RAT) | Malware that gives hackers full control of your computer without you noticing |
| Prompt cache | Reusing previously processed AI requests to save compute costs (relevant to why this attack was expensive for Anthropic) |
🔍 What Actually Happened
- March 25, 2026: Jason Saayman, lead maintainer of axios, receives LinkedIn message from someone claiming to be a company founder
- Fake Slack workspace: Hackers created branded workspace with channels, LinkedIn posts, multiple “employees” — extremely convincing
- Microsoft Teams deepfake: Virtual meeting featured AI-cloned face/voice of real CEO, plus fake attendees
- The hook: Meeting claimed Saayman’s system was “out of date” and needed a Teams component installed
- The payload: “Audio fix” was actually a remote access Trojan giving North Korea full system control
- The breach: Hackers used stolen credentials to publish malicious axios versions (15.4.0-15.4.3)
- The spread: In 3 hours, malware reached ~3% of scanned environments (millions of potential infection points)
- The aftermath: Multiple other top npm maintainers (including Socket CEO Feross Aboukhadijeh, creator of WebTorrent/StandardJS) report being targeted by identical campaign
📊 By the Numbers
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| axios weekly downloads | 100 million |
| Cloud/code environments using axios | 80% |
| Time malicious versions were live | 3 hours |
| Environments infected in that window | ~3% (per Wiz scans) |
| Other maintainers targeted by same group | 30+ confirmed |
| Maintainer’s 2FA status | Enabled (didn’t matter) |
| North Korean hacker group | UNC1069 |
| Previous targets | Crypto firms, IT companies (to secure jobs) |
💬 The Confession (From the Maintainer Himself)
Jason Saayman published a brutal post-mortem Thursday explaining exactly how he got fooled:
“They reached out masquerading as the founder of a company, they had cloned the company’s founders likeness as well as the company itself. They then invited me to a real Slack workspace. This workspace was branded… The Slack was thought out very well, they had channels where they were sharing LinkedIn posts. The LinkedIn posts I presume just went to the real company’s account, but it was super convincing etc.”
“The meeting had what seemed to be a group of people that were involved. The meeting said something on my system was out of date. I installed the missing item as I presumed it was something to do with Teams, and this was the remote access Trojan. Everything was extremely well coordinated, looked legit and was done in a professional manner.”
Socket’s security team confirmed the pattern: this wasn’t a one-off. It was a coordinated, scalable attack targeting high-trust, high-impact open source maintainers across the Node.js ecosystem.
🔥 Why This Is Different (And Terrifying)
Most supply chain attacks exploit neglected packages. This targeted the most actively maintained, widely trusted package in the ecosystem — with a maintainer who had 2FA enabled.
The North Korean playbook:
- Deep research: Study the target’s network, company relationships, communication style
- Infrastructure: Build fake Slack workspaces, clone LinkedIn profiles, register lookalike domains
- AI cloning: Deepfake video/audio of real executives the target would trust
- Manufactured urgency: Create technical “problem” requiring immediate software install
- Professionalism: Everything polished, branded, multi-person calls — no red flags
What made it work:
- Saayman expected to talk to these people (they impersonated real contacts)
- The Slack workspace looked real (channels, posts, branding, activity)
- Multiple “people” on the call added social proof
- Technical urgency (“your system is out of date”) is normal in developer culture
- Microsoft Teams glitches are common enough that an install prompt seemed reasonable
This isn’t phishing. It’s trust cloning at industrial scale.
Cool. You’re Never Trusting a Video Call Again… Now What the Hell Do We Do? ಠ_ಠ
🛡️ Verify Every Virtual Meeting (Even With 'Your Boss')
If someone you’ve never met IRL invites you to a call and asks you to install anything, treat it as hostile until proven otherwise.
Example: A “recruiter” from Google invites you to a Teams call. Three “Googlers” are on camera. They say your browser needs a plugin to share your screen. STOP. Message someone you know at Google through a different channel (text, LinkedIn DM, verified email) and ask “Is this real?” If you can’t verify independently, decline.
Timeline: Before accepting the meeting → 2 minutes to verify → Potentially save your entire career
🔐 Use Hardware Security Keys for Critical Accounts
2FA via SMS/app can be phished if hackers control your machine. Hardware keys (YubiKey, Titan) require physical presence and can’t be remotely stolen.
Example: npm maintainer in Poland uses YubiKey for package publishing. Even if malware steals session cookies, attacker can’t publish without physical key tap. Package stays clean, 100M weekly users stay safe.
📱 Out-of-Band Verification for Unusual Requests
If anyone asks you to install software, run a command, or share credentials in a call — verify through a completely separate channel (phone call to known number, Signal message, in-person).
Example: Freelance developer in Argentina gets Slack message from “CTO” asking to run a script to fix staging environment. Instead of running it, she texts the CTO’s cell (saved from onboarding). CTO replies “I never sent that — report it to security immediately.” Attack stopped, credentials safe.
🔍 Audit Your Dependency Tree Regularly
Use tools like Socket, Snyk, or npm audit to scan for malicious packages. Set up CI/CD alerts for unexpected version bumps in critical dependencies.
Example: Startup in Vietnam runs Socket in GitHub Actions. axios auto-updates to 15.4.2 (malicious version). Socket flags “new network behavior detected” and blocks the build. Team pins to 15.3.0, dodges the breach.
🧠 Train Your Team on Deepfake Red Flags
Voice cloning is trivial now (11 seconds of audio). Video deepfakes are getting there. Establish “panic phrases” or verification questions only real colleagues would know.
Example: Remote team in Brazil institutes policy: any call requesting credentials/installs must include answer to randomly selected personal question (“What did we eat at the offsite?”). Deepfake can’t improvise real memories. Attack fails.
🛠️ Follow-Up Actions
| Want | Do |
|---|---|
 Protect package publishing |
Enable npm 2FA + hardware key; use npm access to limit collaborators |
 Check if you’re infected |
Run npm ls axios — if 15.4.0-15.4.3 appears, rotate all credentials immediately |
 Verify unexpected contacts |
Google the sender’s domain registration date, check LinkedIn “joined” dates, reverse-image-search profile pics |
| Harden virtual meetings |
Require meeting links from known emails only; never install software suggested in first calls |
 Set up out-of-band channels |
Exchange Signal numbers with key collaborators for emergency verification |
Quick Hits
| Want | Do |
|---|---|
| Scan dependencies now |
npx socket security audit or npm audit — check for axios 15.4.0-15.4.3 |
| Lock down npm account |
npm profile enable-2fa auth-and-writes + hardware key |
| Report suspicious outreach |
Forward to [email protected] + your company security team |
 Verify “exec” calls |
Text real phone number before installing anything suggested in virtual meeting |
| Rotate credentials if exposed |
Assume compromise if you ran axios 15.4.0-15.4.3 — change all API keys/passwords |
If a CEO you’ve never met asks you to install something in a Teams call, the correct answer is “let me call you back” — not “yes.”
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